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Review of Judge Samuel Alito's Record in Worker Rights Cases
Prepared by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)
December 14, 2005
This review includes decisions and dissents authored by Judge Alito in cases
involving basic statutes enacted by Congress to protect workers: the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the National Labor Relations Act (and other
labor relations laws), the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act. This review includes several decisions and
dissents of concern in cases involving statutes barring employment discrimination, such
as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. This
summary does not include decisions in which Judge Alito participated but did not author
an opinion. It also does not include summary decisions issued without published
opinions (either affirming agency decisions or granting petitions for review). This review
includes information on the appointing president of participating judges.
The 25 opinions included in this review may be categorized as follows 1:
3 Number of cases in which Judge Alito authored a majority opinion that
was favorable to workers or unions
9 Number of cases in which Judge Alito authored a majority opinion that
was unfavorable to workers or unions
1 Number of cases in which Judge Alito authored a dissenting opinion that
was favorable to workers or unions
7 Number of cases in which Judge Alito authored a dissenting opinion that
was unfavorable to workers or unions
5 Number of cases in which Judge Alito's opinion cannot be characterized
as favorable or unfavorable (e.g., case decided on procedural grounds)
Fair Labor Standards Act
Denying Overtime to Newspaper Reporters. In Reich v. Gateway Press, 13
F.3d 685 (1994), Judge Alito authored a dissenting opinion in which he concluded that a
group of newspaper reporters were not covered by the overtime compensation
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Secretary of Labor sued Gateway
Press, a publisher of 19 community newspapers in the Pittsburgh suburbs, claiming that
the company had violated minimum wage and overtime requirements with respect to
I Employment discrimination opinions are not included in this count because, as indicated, this review
includes some, but not all, of Judge Alito's employment discrimination rulings, which are voluminous.
reporters who routinely worked more than 40 hours a week. The issue in the case
concerned a provision of the FLSA which exempts employees of a "small newspaper"
(i.e., one within certain prescribed circulation limits). The majority opinion, by Judge
Becker (Reagan appointee) and joined by Judge Nygaard (Reagan), held that, in
computing circulation, "newspaper" meant any individual newspaper or any set of related
newspapers that constituted an "enterprise" within the statute's definition of that term. A
separate provision of the statute called for aggregation of gross sales among related
businesses that constitute an "enterprise" for determining whether the business was
engaged in commerce and within the FLSA' s jurisdiction. The majority borrowed the
"enterprise" concept from this provision and applied it in aggregating the circulation of
affiliated newspapers, finding this approach to be most consistent with the statutory
purpose. The majority found that Gateway maintained strict control over both the
organization and content of each of the newspapers and made all employment related
decisions, and therefore it constituted an enterprise. Judge Alito dissented, and would
have denied the workers the protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act, arguing that
neither the statute nor the legislative history supported the majority's opinion.
Finding FLSA Coverage for Foreign Seamen. In a pro-worker opinion, Cruz et
at. v. Chesapeake Shipping et ai., 932 F.2d 218 (1991), Judge Alito authored a dissenting
opinion that disagreed with the majority's holding that the FLSA did not cover foreign
seamen employed on reflagged ships operating outside the United States. (Reflagging is
the temporary transfer of ownership of a foreign-owned ship to a United States
corporation. In this case, the reflagging occurred to afford protection to Kuwaiti tankers
under threat from Iran during the Iran-Iraq war). Judge Rosenn (Nixon appointee),
writing for the court, held employment on a reflagged vessel was a unique situation and
that the vessels were not "in commerce" as required by the FLSA because they lacked a
sufficient "domestic nexus." Judge Cowen (Reagan appointee) concurred in the
judgment but reasoned that under choice of law analysis from admiralty cases, foreign,
and not United States, law governed the dispute. Judge Alito wrote a dissent, finding the
statutory language ambiguous and finding that FLSA coverage was supported by the
legislative history.
Bankruptcy-
Excusing Corporate Officers from Personal Liability for Unpaid Wages. In
Belcufine v. Aloe, 112 F .3d 633 (1997), Alito authored a majority opinion that appeared
to allow personal policy judgments -in this case, concern about potential financial
liability for corporate officers --to override statutory language. This opinion stands in
marked contrast to the literal approach Judge Alito typically takes in interpreting worker
protection statutes. In Belcufine, Alito held that a Pennsylvania law holding corporate
officers personally liable for unpaid wages and benefits was no longer applicable
following the filing of a bankruptcy petition. In Alito' s view, the corporate officers
should not be held liable for wages because once a bankruptcy petition has been filed,
they are no longer empowered to choose to divert the corporation's funds to pay accrued
wages and benefits. Judge Greenberg (Reagan appointee) dissented, finding no statutory
limit on the liability of corporate officers. Judge Greenberg observed that the majority
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"apparently believes that practical consideration require it to reach its result," because
otherwise the liabilities for corporate officers in bankruptcy could be significant.
Occupational Safety and Health Act
Vacating OSHA Citations for "Failure to Abate" Safety Violations. In Alden
Leeds v. OSHA, 298 F .3d 256 (2002), Alito authored a majority opinion, joined by Roth
(Bush I) and Schwarzer (Ford), reversing OSHA's citation of a company for "failure to
abate" workplace safety violations that were the subject of a previous citation. The
company had been cited in 1993 for 13 specific instances of improper storage of
chemicals. The facility was re-inspected in 1994. In 1995, OSHA cited the company for
33 additional instances of improper storage of chemicals. Alito concluded that the 1993
citations did not put the company on sufficient notice that the violations at issue
concerned improper storage practices generally, and not just the 13 specific instances
cited by OSHA. He therefore concluded that the requirements for a "failure to abate"
violation had not been met.
Mine Safety and Black Lung Benefits
Questioning MSHA Jurisdiction at a Coal Processing Plant. RNS Services,
Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 115 F.3d 182 (1997). The Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) cited an employer engaged in coal processing for violations of
mine safety laws. The employer's jurisdictional challenges to the citations were rejected
by the Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (MSHRC) and the Third Circuit
majority. Alito dissented from an opinion by Judge Cowen and joined by Judge
Greenberg (both Reagan appointees) holding that the coal processing site was a "mine"
within the meaning of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act (so that MSHA had
jurisdiction over the site). In dissent, Alito questioned whether MSHA had jurisdiction
over the facility, and argued for a narrower interpretation of the agency's authority -an
interpretation that would deprive many workers ofMSHA's protections. Judge Alito
would have remanded the case back to the Review Commission for further consideration
of whether it had jurisdiction over the site.
Awarding Black Lung Benefits. Cort v. Director, Office of Workers
Compensation Programs, 996 F.2d 1549 (1993). Alito authored an opinion joined by
Stapleton (Reagan) and Seitz (Johnson) awarding a miner black lung benefits and ruling
that the ALJ had improperly allowed eligibility to be rebutted on grounds not provided
for in the regulations.
Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act. Pennsylvania Tidewater Dock
Co. v. DOL Office of Workers Compensation Programs, 202 F.3d 656 (2000). Alito
authored an opinion, joined by Judges Nygaard (Reagan) and Rosenn (Nixon), reversing
the DOL Benefits Review Board's denial of "special-fund relief' to the company. Under
the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, employers who hire workers with
permanent partial disabilities are responsible for the first 104 weeks of workers'
compensation; the remaining weeks come out of a special fund. The ALJ had awarded
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the employer "special fund" benefits, but the Benefits Review Board disagreed. Alito
held that "because a reasonable judge could conclude that [the worker] was suffering
from a serious disability and that his workplace injuries merely pushed him over the edge
into permanent total disability," payment of his benefits from the special fund was
appropriate.
Plant Closings (Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act)
Excusing Employers for Plant Closings Caused by Government Action.
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Int 'I Union v. Elsinore Shore Associates,
173 F.3d 175 (1998). The court majority, in an opinion by Scirica (Reagan appointee)
and Sloviter (Carter appointee) affirmed the trial court's decision that an employer was
excused from giving 60 days notice of a business closing because of the occurrence of
unforeseeable business circumstances. The casino was in declining financial condition,
and after months of oversight, the Casino Control Commission ordered the casino to
close. Alito wrote separately to emphasize his view that employers are not required to
give notice under the WARN Act when the government, rather than the employer, orders
the plant closing.
National Labor Relations Act
Crediting Employer Defenses to Discrimination against Employees for Union
Activity. In NLRB v. Alan Motor Lines Inc., 937 F.2d 887 (1991), Judge A1ito authored
a majority opinion joined by Judges Stapleton (Reagan appointee) and Cahn (Ford
appointee sitting by designation) setting aside the NLRB's decision. The question in the
case was whether the employer had sufficiently made out a defense to a claim that it had
discriminatorily failed to recall union supporters from layoff. Alito concluded that the
NLRB's decision should be set aside because it failed to resolve a tension between the
Board's conclusion that the employer had not proven its defense, and the ALJ's decision,
which had credited exonerating testimony by the employer. The NLRB did not overrule
the ALJ's credibility determination, but found that the official's testimony was
outweighed by other evidence of discriminatory motive. Alito wrote that the Board could
have, on the basis of the record as a whole, overruled the ALJ's crediting of the president,
but opted not to.
Overturning the Board's Decision Upholding a Union Election. In Indiana
Hospital, Inc. v. NLRB, 10 F.3d 151 (1993), the National Labor Relations Board upheld a
hearing officer's recommendation dismissing objections to a union election. Judge Alito
authored an opinion joined by Judges Scirica (Reagan appointee) and Aldisert (Johnson)
granting the employer's petition for review and remanding the case back to the NLRB.
The issue in the case was the hearing officer's decision to revoke subpoenas for the case-
intake logs of the Region's information officer. The employer claimed in its objections
that the Board's neutrality in the election had been compromised by advice given by
NLRB information officers to employee-voters, and it wanted the logs to determine
which NLRB agents the employees had spoken with. The NLRB upheld the revocation
of the subpoenas on the basis that it did not "prejudice" the employer, because the
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employer could have, but failed to, call as witnesses the employees the infonnation
officer allegedly spoke to. But Judge Alito found that the employer might have been
prejudiced by the revocation, because it could have called the Board agents to testify or
used the logs to help guide its examination of the employees. Observing that the Board's
decision "stands or falls on its express findings or reasoning," Judge Alito, while
acknowledging there might have been other grounds on which to uphold the revocation
of the subpoenas, granted the employer's petition for review, and the case was remanded
to the NLRB.
Remanding the NLRB's Finding that a Company was Liable as an Alter Ego.
In Stardyne v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 141 (1994), Judge Alito remained true to fonD, authoring
an opinion, joined by Judges Stapleton (Reagan) and Lewis (Bush I) remanding a case to
the Board because of a technical deficiency. The NLRB found that an employer was not
a "single employer" of another company, but was liable as its alter ego. Alito found that
the Board's alter ego doctrine was a legitimate exercise of the Board's statutory "gap-
filling" authority, and said that courts should defer to the test because it is consistent with
the policies of the Act. Alito further agreed with the Board that an intent to evade
collective bargaining is not a necessary criterion for a finding of alter ego status. He also
found that the record of the case substantially supported the Board's alter ego finding.
But, Alito pointed to an earlier case, cited by the company, holding that the alter ego
concept was a subset of the single employer concept. While "unsure why the alter ego
should be regarded as a subset of the single employer doctrine," given that the doctrines
facially possessed distinct and non-overlapping criteria, Alito observed that the Board
had squarely held alter ego to be a subset of single employer, and therefore an employer
could not be an alter ego but not a single employer. Alito remanded the case back to the
Board for a further explanation of its decision.
Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act
Criminalizing "No Docking" Provisions in Collective Bargaining
Agreements. Caterpillar v. UAW, 107 F.3d 1052 (1997), involved the legality ofa
longstanding and widespread practice of employers and unions negotiating "no docking"
provisions in their collective bargaining agreements. These provisions allow employees
to perfonn grievance handling and other collective bargaining functions on behalf of the
bargaining unit while drawing their regular pay and benefits from their employer. The
majority opinion upheld the legality of "no docking" provisions, and was authored by
Judge Nygaard (Reagan appointee), and joined by eight other judges. Judges Mansmann
and Greenberg (both Reagan appointees) wrote a dissent. Alito wrote a separate dissent,
and concluded that the "no docking" arrangement was a violation of Section 302 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, which criminalizes the payment of things of value by
employers to labor organizations except ''as compensation for, or by reason of, his
service as an employee of such employer." While prefacing his opinion by stating, "If I
were a legislator, I would not vote to criminalize" the kinds of paid-leave for grievance
chairs at issue in this case, he nonetheless determined that the "plain meaning" of the
statute did just that.
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Labor Management Relations Act
InLuden's Inc. v. Local 6, BCTWU, 28 F.3d 347 (1994), Judge Alito dissented
from Judge Becker's majority decision compelling arbitration of a grievance. The case
concerned whether a dispute which arose after the termination of a contract could be
deemed to have arisen under the old contract's arbitration clause. The district court
found the dispute was not arbitrable. Judge Becker's opinion held that, by its conduct of
continuing to honor its terms and to discuss and resolve disputes as if it were still in
effect, and its failure to disavow the arbitration provision, the company had entered into
an implied-in-fact contract containing the obligation to arbitrate disputes contained
therein. Alito dissented, arguing that the company's conduct standing alone did not
amount to agreement to enter into an implied-in-fact contract and that what the majority
had actually done was to create, by judicial fiat, a set of facts in which the courts will
apply a contract -in other words, an implied-in-law contract.
In Wheeler v. Graco Trucking, 985 F .2d 108 (1993), Alito, writing for the
unanimous majority, held (1) that an employee's hybrid duty of fair representation-
contract claim against his employer and union for an alleged failure to pay contractual
wages was barred because he never filed a grievance over the matter; and (2) that Section
301 preempted claims under state wage collection laws.
Setting Aside Arbitration Award. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's
Union, 993 F .2d 357 (1993). Alito authored an opinion, joined by Judge Scirica
(Reagan), setting aside an arbitration award as contrary to public policy. The award
required the company to reinstate a boat helmsman terminated for a positive drug test
after his ship ran aground. Judge Seitz dissented, saying that arbitration awards should be
upheld unless it would amount to judicial condonation of illegal acts.
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
Berardi v. Swanson Memorial Lodge No. 48 of the Fraternal Order of Police, 920
F.2d 198 (1990). Alito authored a unanimous opinion reversing the District Court's
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against the union for lack of jurisdiction (union was not
a "labor organization" within the meaning of the LMRDA.) In Alito's view, the trial
court dismissed on grounds not raised by the union, and the plaintiff was entitled to an
opportunity to respond.
Federal Employee Unions' Right to Information
In FederaZ Labor ReZations Authority v. Department of Navy, 966 F.2d 747 (1992), the
court, in an en banc opinion authored by Judge Mansmann (Reagan appointee), enforced
a Federal Labor Relations Authority order requiring the Navy to disclose to the union the
home addresses of employees within a particular bargaining unit represented by the
union. Judge Alito dissented, joined by Judge Stapleton (Reagan), saying that the
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employees have a privacy interest in their home addresses, and that there is no public
interest cognizable under FOIA in the disclosure of these addresses. The Supreme Court
subsequently ruled against disclosure in a different case, holding that the information was
exempt from disclosure under FOIA. 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
Labor Cases Involving Constitutional Issues
Union Security Clauses are not "State Action". In White v. CW A, 370 F .3d 346
(2004), Alito authored a unanimous opinion joined by Judges Ambro (Clinton appointee)
and Chertoff (Bush II appointee) holding that a union's conduct with respect to
notification of Beck rights under a union security clause is not state action subject to
Constitutional scrutiny because the clause is fundamentally part of a private agreement.
Alito compared the union's exclusive bargaining authority status to state-sponsored
monopolies, whose contractual arrangements are not deemed state action.
State Employee Rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act/Sovereign
Immunity. Chittister v. Dep't of Comm y and Economic Dev., 226 F .3d 223 (2000),
involved the question of whether Congress validly abrogated state Eleventh Amendment
immunity in enacting the medical leave provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act,
such that state employees would be allowed to sue their state employers for violations of
the law. Alito authored the majority opinion, finding that Congress had not overcome the
state's sovereign immunity, meaning that state employees could not sue their state
employer to enforce their rights. Alito wrote that in order for Congress to validly protect
state employees' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, there must be a connection
between the discrimination problem Congress is trying to address, and the law it passes.
In Alito's view, the FMLA failed this test. Alito ruled that even if Congress had made
findings that the FMLA was being adopted to address discrimination by the states, the
FMLA was a disproportionate solution to the problem, because in his view, it did more
than remedy discrimination -it created an entitlement to family and medical leave. The
Supreme Court later decided otherwise with respect to the family leave provisions of the
FMLA (Nevada Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs -opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist).
Drug Testing/Union Authority to Consent. In Bolden v. SEPTA, 953 F .2d 807
(1991), A1ito wrote for a nearly unanimous en banc panel of the Court, largely upholding
a former employee's Fourth Amendment privacy claim against SEPTA, but also holding
that a union can consent to searches that might otherwise be unlawful under the Fourth
Amendment. Alito held that a union may, unless it violates an employee's duty of fair
representation, prospectively waive an employee's privacy rights with respect to drug
testing. Therefore, the plaintiff s backpay in this case ended when the union settled his
grievances by, in part, consenting prospectively to drug testing and agreeing that
reinstatement of the plaintiff was conditioned on submission to a drug test. One judge
(Nygaard -Reagan appointee) dissented.
ERISA Cases
Upholding Employer Liability for Delinquent Contributions. In Sheet Metal
Workers Locat19 et at. v. Keystone Heating, 934 F.2d 35 (1991), Alito authored a
unanimous opinion, joined by Judges Becker and Nygaard (Reagan appointees), holding
that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the union's claim that the
employer remained a party to a contract despite being in breach for many years, and that
the district court properly allowed the union to seek delinquent fund contributions even
though its complaint only sought an audit of company records, because the pleadings
alerted the employer that payment of overdue contributions would be sought. Alito also
held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the claim for
delinquent payments because Section 502(g)(2) of ERISA entitles the defendant
employer to a jury trial, based on the ERISA section's provision that authorizes courts to
give "legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate," given that past Supreme
Court cases have held that use of the terms "legal relief' connotes the right to a jury trial.
Finding State Law on Fringe Benefit Collection Preempted. In Bricklayers
Local 33 Benefit Fund v. America's Marble Source, Inc., 950 F.2d 114 (1991), Judge
A1ito authored a unanimous opinion, joined by Judges Mansmann and Diamond (by
designation), holding that ERISA preempted a New Jersey statute ("Fringe Benefit Act")
providing that, where a contractor or subcontractor is delinquent on fringe benefit
payments, a benefit fund may move for the suspension of payments by the owner of the
project to the contractor or the subcontractor, and may have these payments instead
diverted to make whole the benefit fund. Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts "any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan"
governed by ERISA. Alito found that most, if not all, fringe benefit funds covered by the
state statute would be ERISA funds, and therefore the state law "related to" ERISA
funds.
Widow not Entitled to Additional Life Insurance Benefits under Employer's
Policy. Gridley v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310 (1991). Alito authored a
unanimous opinion, joined by Mansmann (Reagan appointee) and Garth (Nixon), holding
that the widow of a former employee was not entitled to increased life insurance benefits,
because the increase was adopted after her husband was no longer "actively at work", as
required by the policy. Alito rejected the argument that a company brochure, which did
not contain the "actively at work" requirement, constituted a Summary Plan Description
or that it entitled the widow to the benefits.
Employee not Entitled to Credit for Pre-ERISA Service. DiGiacomo v.
Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 420 F.3d 220 (2005). The majority, in an opinion
authored by Judge Garth (Nixon appointee), held that DiGiacomo was entitled to credit
for 10.5 years of pre-ERISA work prior to a five year break in service. Alito dissented,
saying that ERISA authorized the plan to treat benefits accrued prior to the passage of
ERISA as forfeitable upon a break in service.
8
Reversing Summary Judgment in Pension Contribution Case Because of
Issue of Material Fact. Einhorn v. Fleming Foods a/Pennsylvania, 258 F.3d 192
(2001). Alito authored a unanimous opinion, joined by Judges McKee and Kravitch,
reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment in a pension contribution case
based on the existence of a genuine issue of material fact (ambiguity in the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement).
Examples of Discrimination Decisions of Concern
Raising the Bar on the Evidence Required of Plaintiffs in Race
Discrimination Cases. Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986 (1997). Bray, a hotel
employee, claimed that she was illegally denied a promotion by her employer because of
her race. The court majority, in an opinion by Judge McKee (Clinton appointee) and
joined by Judge Green (sitting by designation), held that Bray presented sufficient
evidence of discrimination to merit a jury trial, but Judge Alito dissented. In his
judgment, the evidence established that the hotel had merely committed "minor
inconsistencies" in its promotion practices, and it was wrong to allow "disgruntled
employees to impose the costs of trial on employers." The majority opinion strongly
criticized Judge Alito's "tightly constricted" approach to Title VII:
The dissent argues that none of the evidentiary discrepancies
would allow a reasonable jury to doubt Marriott's proffered explanation
that it was looking for "the best" candidate and that therefore Bray cannot
prevail. We do not believe that Title VII analysis is so tightly constricted.
[Title VII] must not be applied in a manner that ignores the sad reality that
racial animus can all too easily warp an individual's perspective to the
point that he or she never considers the member of a protected class the
"best" candidate regardless of that person's credentials. The dissent's
position would immunize an employer from the reach of Title VII if the
employer's belief that it had selected the "best" candidate was the result of
conscious racial bias. ...Indeed, Title VII would be eviscerated if our
analysis were to halt where the dissent suggests.
Prevented Age Discrimination Trial Despite Evidence that Employer said
Employee was "Too Old." Keller v. ORlXCredit Alliance, 130 F.3d 1101 (1997).
Keller, the fonner vice president of the corporation, brought an age discrimination case
when the president of the company said he might be "too old for the job", that "maybe
[he] should go hire one or two young bankers," then passed him over for a promotion and
fired him. Over the dissent of other judges, Judge Alito granted summary judgment to
the corporation, preventing a trial on the employee's claim, creating a high burden of
proof that few victims of age discrimination are likely to meet.
Requiring More Evidence to Prove Gender Discrimination. Sheridan v. E.l.
DuPont de Nemours, 100 F.3d 1061 (1996). Judge Alito was the sole dissenter in an en
banc gender discrimination case involving the question of whether a gender
discrimination plaintiff can get her case to a jury after showing that the employer's
alleged reasons for the discriminatory action were a pretext for illegal discrimination.
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The court majority followed the same approach as other circuit courts and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and said that plaintiffs should get their day in
court if they can show the employer's alleged reasons are a pretext for illegal
discrimination. But Judge Alito dissented, arguing for a narrower rule that would have
made it harder for gender discrimination plaintiffs to get to trial.
Other Decisions of Note
Availability of Judicial Review of Base-Closing Decisions. Specter v. Garrett, 971
F.2d 936 (1992) concerned the question of whether decisions to close military bases
pursuant to the Base Closure and Realignment Act are subject to judicial review. Senator
Arlen Specter, other members of Congress, shipyard employees and their unions, and
others, brought suit seeking to enjoin a decision to close the Philadelphia naval shipyard.
The majority, in an opinion by Judges Stapleton and Scirica (both Reagan appointees),
concluded that the unions had standing to challenge the base closing, and that limited
judicial review was available to them. Judge Alito dissented, saying that judicial review
of base closing decisions would "thwart the [statutory] scheme's fundamental objectives"
of "speed, finality, and limiting the President and the Congress to an all-or-nothing
choice on a package of recommendations." The court's mandate was vacated by the
Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v. Massachusetts, involving a challenge to census
methods and the means for determining seats in Congress. On reconsideration, the
majority reached the same result, i.e., limited judicial review is available to the plaintiffs.
Again, Judge Alito dissented and said no judicial review was available. 995 F .2d 404.
The Third Circuit's decision was reversed by the Supreme Court, which held that
decisions of the President are not reviewable under the APA, and that the Commission's
decisions being challenged by plaintiffs are not "final agency action." 511 U.S. 462
(1994).
Reach of Congressional Authority under the Commerce Clause. In United States v.
Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997), the Third Circuit
majority, in an opinion by Judges Sloviter and Rendell (by designation), upheld against a
Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenge a federal statute making it
"unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun." Five other circuit courts
had reached the same conclusion. But Judge Alito dissented, arguing that Congress had
not made specific findings or presented empirical evidence demonstrating the connection
between the law and interstate commerce, and that the law should be struck down as
outside Congress' legislative powers under the Commerce Clause in light of the Supreme
Court's earlier decision in Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In response, the court majority
said, "Nothing in Lopez requires either Congress or the Executive to play Show and Tell
with the federal courts at the peril of invalidation of a Congressional statute."
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